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NOTES
WILSON V JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORP.
AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
LATENT INJURY LITIGATION:
AN EQUITABLE
EXPANSION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE
Litigation involving injuries caused by exposure to deleterious sub-
stances has multiplied at an ever-increasing rate in the last decade.' Typi-
cally, an individual who is exposed to a toxic substance is unaware of the
harm it might cause until an injury manifests itself many years later. Con-
sequently, an important threshold procedural issue in any latent injury liti-
gation is whether the action was filed within the time limit prescribed by
the applicable statute of limitations.2 Courts have rejected the traditional
rule that a limitations period commences at the time of the harmful expo-
sure, and have opted for the more equitable "discovery rule." Under this
rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when a person discovers or, in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury.3
The recent trend in latent injury litigation has been to apply the discovery
1. It is projected that lawsuits involving latent diseases, which appear several years
after initial exposure to a toxic substance, will dominate tort law in the 1980's. Twenty-five
thousand lawsuits seeking damages for exposure to asbestos were filed through 1980. See
Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139 (1981). In addition, 16,000 asbestos cases are
currently pending, and asbestos cases are being filed at a rate of approximately 450 a month.
Asbestos Lawsuits Spur War Among Insurers With Billions At Stake, Wall St. J., June 14,
1982, at 1, col. 6. See also Granelli, The Asbestos Case Explosion, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1981
at 1.
2. See generally Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury
Claims.- An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 501 (1982). A tort statute of limita-
tions requires an action for personal injuries to be filed within a specific time period, usually
one to six years after a cause of action accrues. McGovern, The Status ofStatutes of Limita-
tions and Statutes ofRepose In Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416,
438-40 (1980). A cause of action accrues when every fact necessary for a plaintiff to support
his right to judgment exists. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30, at 144-
45 (4th ed. 1971). See infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis due to exposure to silica
dust) (Federal Employers Liability Act); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.
1980) (heart failure due to exposure to nitroglycerin) (Federal Tort Claims Act); McKenna
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1980) (cerebrovascular stroke due to
ingestion of oral contraceptive) (applying Ohio law); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis due to asbestos exposure) (applying Minne-
sota law); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis
due to asbestos exposure) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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rule in order to provide recovery to latent injury victims. 4
The application of the discovery rule in latent injury litigation is compli-
cated further when a person, years after discovering one injury, discovers
an entirely separate injury resulting from the same harmful exposure. A
number of courts have continued the trend toward expansion of the dis-
covery rule and have held that the limitations period begins upon discov-
ery of the second injury.5 These courts, however, have failed to address
the question whether application of the discovery rule to a second injury
violates the well-established rule against splitting a cause of action.6 Rec-
ognizing this deficiency, in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
cently offered a practical analysis of the statute of limitations and deter-
mined that application of the discovery rule to a second injury does not
violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
Henry Wilson, an asbestos insulation worker for over thirty years, suf-
fered two separate injuries as a result of his exposure to asbestos materials.
In 1973, he contracted asbestosis8, but continued to work in the insulation
trade for two more years. In 1978, Wilson was diagnosed as having
mesothelioma, a cancer affecting the lining of the lung. 9 Three months
4. See Kahan, Statutes of Limitations Problems in Cases ofInsidious Diseases: The De-
velopment of the Discovery Rule, 2 J. PROD. LIAB. 127, 128 (1978); Birnbaum, '"Frst Breath's
Last Gasp." The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 283-84 (1977);
Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases.- The Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp. Dale of the Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REV. 615, 623 (1982); W. PROSSER, supra
note 2, § 30 at 145.
5. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981), Martinez-Ferrer v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980). But see Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 124-209-10330 (Bait. County, Md., Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 1981),
cert. denied, No. 7 (Md. Mar. 22, 1982).
6. In accordance with public policy, and to prevent the defendant from suffering the
hardship of unnecessary piecemeal litigation, a single cause of action cannot be split and
made the subject of different actions. IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.410(2), at 1163-
64 (2d ed. 1982). Splitting a cause of action is prevented by the doctrine of resjudicata. The
doctrine requires that all grounds upon which a single claim is based must be asserted and
concluded in one action, and not renewed in a separate suit. C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 78 (3d ed. 1976).
7. 684 F.2d Ill (D.C. Cir. 1982).
8. Asbestosis is a progressive, irreversible lung disease caused by the inhalation of as-
bestos fibers. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 128 (5th unabr. law. ed. 1972). For a
discussion of asbestosis and its effect on industrial insulation workers, see Selikoff, Bader,
Bader, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence fAsbestosis Among Insulation Workers, 132
ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965).
9. Mesothelioma is a cancer of the mesothelial cells which line the chest walls and
surround the organs of the chest cavity. It is an extremely rare form of cancer, offers a poor
prognosis for recovery, and is usually fatal. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
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later Wilson died. His widow filed suit in federal court under the District
of Columbia's survival and wrongful death statutes against the designers,
manufacturers, and distributors of asbestos products. The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and ruled that the
three year statute of limitations period began when Wilson discovered that
he had asbestosis. The court therefore held that his action was time-
barred.' The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed and held that the discovery of an asbestos-related disease
did not commence the statute of limitations on claims concerning all sepa-
rate, distinct, and later-manifested diseases that might be caused by the
same asbestos exposure."
This Note will trace the evolution of the statute of limitations from the
common law, and illustrate the traditional and modem procedures used to
determine when a cause of action accrues. It will examine the ingenious
statute of limitations analysis delineated in Wilson, and demonstrate its
consistency with the recent trend toward the expansive application of the
discovery rule in latent injury litigation. Finally, this Note will comment
on the potential impact of Wilson upon the manufacturers and exposure
victims of toxic substances.
I. THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
LATENT INJURY LITIGATION
At common law, courts recognized perpetual rights to a cause of action
in contract and tort. 2 Elaborate procedural requirements reduced the
likelihood of untimely suits.'3 Therefore, it was not until more convenient
forms of action emerged that the need for a statute of limitations arose.
The Limitations Act of 1623'" established different limitations periods for
note 8, at 861. Like asbestosis, this disease manifests itself many years after inhalation be-
gins. See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DIsEASE, 241-44 (1978).
10. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 79-1337 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1981).
11. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 112.
12. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178
(1950).
13. At common law, the complicated procedures of filing a claim discouraged many
people from pursuing actions at all, much less pursuing an action at a later date. In addi-
tion, if a party to the action died, the action became invalid. Thus, if a person sought to file
a tort claim, the individual usually filed within the prescribed time limit. Id See also At-
kinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 157
(1927).
14. 21 Jac. I., ch. 16 (1623). The purpose of the Act was to keep inconsequential claims
out of the King's court and to minimize the hardship which suits in the King's court imposed
on poor defendants. Developments, supra note 12, at 1178.
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different causes of action.' 5 Most early American state legislatures
adopted the Act with only slight variations.'
6
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect defendants and
courts from stale claims by encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit in a timely
fashion.' 7 Timely adjudication ensures that fresh evidence is used to de-
cide questions of fact and that essential witnesses are available to testify."8
In addition, statutes of limitations allow potential defendants to plan eco-
nomic activity free from the threat of distant liability.19
A statute of limitations commences to run when an individual's right of
action first accrues.20 Traditionally, courts have held that an action first
accrues when a person is initially exposed to a harmful substance, even if
the person, as in latent injury actions, remains blamelessly ignorant of the
tort or the harm it produces until long after the limitations period has ex-
15. Actions of trespass quare clausumfregit, debt, detinue, replevin, and actions on the
case or for account were limited to six years. Actions for trespass, assault, battery, wound-
ing, and imprisonment had to be filed within four years; actions on the case for words were
required to be filed within two years. The shorter period for torts involving injuries to the
person indicates the early recognition of the unreliability of the evidence of such claims, as
well as the general disfavor of personal injury actions. Kelley, Discovery Rulefor Personal
Injury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV.
1641, 1646 (1978).
16. Each state has statutes of limitations that govern the time for bringing suit for the
majority of actions. These statutes usually fix time limits for filing suits to recover interests
in land, suits on oral and written contracts, actions for injuries to the person or property, and
"all other actions." While the language varies among the states, most statutes provide either
that "all actions ... shall be brought within" or "no action . . . shall be brought more
than" a certain period of time after "the cause thereof accrued." See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-301(8) (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2 (1951).
The limitations statutes usually include provisions for postponement, suspension, or exten-
sion of the period in specified circumstances. Certain felonies, however, such as murder,
manslaughter, arson, and forgery do not have a statute of limitations. Developments, supra
note 12, at 1179.
17. The primary consideration of a statute of limitations is fairness to the defendant.
There should be a time when a defendant can reasonably expect to be free of ancient obliga-
tions. He should not have to defend a claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Railroad Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). Statutes of limitations also relieve the courts of the burden of
adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims. Id
18. See, e.g., id; Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
19. "The foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in
the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser." Holmes, The Path ofthe
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). But see Comment, Occupational Carcinogenesis and
Statutes of Limitations: Resolving Relevant Policy Goals, 10 ENVTL. L. 113 (1979) (the evi-
dentiary purpose of the statute of limitations is unduly harsh in occupational cancer cases).
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 145. For a discussion of four possible accrual
times of statutes of limitations used throughout the country, see Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
117 N.H. 164, 168, 371 A.2d 170, 172 (1977). For a comparison of the various state statutes
of limitations provisions, see McGovern, supra note 2, at 438-40.
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pired.2 1 One of the earliest cases to apply the traditional construction of a
statute of limitations in a latent injury context was Schmidt v. Merchants
Despatch Transportation Co. 22 In Schmidt, the plaintiff alleged that he
had contracted pneumoconiosis 23 as a result of inhaling industrial dust
while employed by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held
that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff inhaled the harmful
dust, even though the injury was not then apparent.24 Although the court
held that Schmidt's cause of action accrued at his initial exposure to the
harmful substance, the court provided that in a timely filed cause of action,
consequential damages that are reasonably anticipated may be included in
the amount of recovery.25 The court noted, however, that the doctrine of
res judicata bars a new action if the consequential damages manifest them-
selves at a later date.26
Recognizing the inherent injustice of requiring plaintiffs to file suit
before they are aware of any actual injury, courts have formulated alterna-
tive theories to determine when a cause of action accrues. 27 The applica-
tion of the discovery rule stands as a significant development in the area of
21. See Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979) (radiation exposure); Peter-
son v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973) (foreign object left in patient's body). See
also Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort
Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 753, 757-64 (1964).
22. 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
23. Pneumonconiosis is a chronic fibrous reaction in the lungs due to the inhalation of
dust. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1108, 1110.
24. 270 N.Y, at 300, 200 N.E. at 827. This is still the general rule in New York. Thorn-
ton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Schwartz
v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
For an examination of the problems created by the traditional application of a statute of
limitations in New York, see Note, Accrual Dilemma: Statutes of Limitations in Hazardous
Waste Cases, 45 ALB. L. REV. 717 (1981).
25. The traditional American rule is that recovery of consequential damages, damages
based on future consequences, may be recovered only if such consequences are "reasonably
certain." Courts generally require that a plaintiff prove that there is a greater than 50%
chance that the future damages will occur. See, e.g., Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d
994, 997 (6th Cir. 1969); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 629 (W. Va. 1974). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910, comment a (1965); King, Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences,
90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1371-72 (1981).
26. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 386.
27. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (a cause of action accrues when the
"accumulated effects" of the exposure manifest themselves); Goodman v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976) (a cause of action accrues when a person discovers the
injury, its cause, and that the injury was negligently inflicted by another); Grigsby v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1975) (a cause of action accrues when a person discov-
ers the injury and its cause).
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limitation statutes.2" The rule dictates that a cause of action accrues when
a person discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the injury which gives rise to the cause of action.29 Therefore,
before a statute of limitations begins to run, a person must have notice of
the cause of action-an awareness either that an injury has occurred or
that another person has committed a legal wrong which ultimately may
result in bodily harm.30
The major impetus in the development of the discovery rule was the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Urie v. 7hompson .3" In Urie, a
railroad fireman contracted silicosis as a result of his exposure to silica
dust over a thirty-year period. He filed suit under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act3 2 (FELA) against the trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad.
The Court rejected the railroad's contention that the three-year limitations
period began when Urie was exposed to silica dust in 1910."3 This inter-
pretation conflicted with Congressional intent to provide relief to injured
employees under FELA. To resolve this dilemma, the Court reasoned that
Urie's cause of action did not accrue until the accumulated effects of the
silica dust manifested themselves in 1940." 4 Because Urie filed suit in
1941, the Court held that his claim was timely.
28. See Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and The Statute of Limita-
dons, 1976 ILL. B. J. 326 (1976); Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations. California's
Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106 (1980). Comment, Torts-
Limitation of Actions-Accrual of a Cause of Action in Products Liability and Other Tort
Actions, 42 TENN. L. REV. 593 (1975).
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. Few problems of knowledge arise in ordinary personal injury actions because some
impact or trauma caused by an immediate blow notifies a plaintiff of the violation of his or
her rights. Developments, supra note 12, at 1204. See Estep & Van Dyke, supra note 21, at
764.
31. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
32. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides in
pertinent part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce. . . shall be liable
in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce. . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason
of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
Id
33. 337 U.S. at 169. For a discussion of the traditional rule of accrual, see supra notes
20-25 and accompanying text.
34. 337 U.S. at 170 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n,
124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932). Courts have interpreted the Urie decision
as the discovery rule, which holds that a cause of action does not accrue until "the plaintiff
either knew or had reason to know of the disease." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1101 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See Stoleson v. United
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In adopting the discovery rule3 5 , the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress intended to compensate occupational disease victims under
FELA. Therefore, a mechanical analysis of the statute of limitations that
would define accrual at an unrecorded moment in the development of the
disease had to be rejected.36 In the Court's view, charging a person with
knowledge of a latent disease before its manifestation would force him to
waive his rights to recovery if he later discovered a disability. Convinced
that the Act was intended to afford plaintiffs with more than a "delusive
remedy", the Court refused to deny relief because of Urie's "blameless
ignorance."37 Thus, the Supreme Court's use of the discovery rule revolu-
tionized the traditional interpretation of statutes of limitations by ex-
tending relief to those employees who suffered injuries years after their
exposure to a harmful substance.
Urie established that a plaintiff's notice of his injury is essential in latent
injury litigation to the accrual of a cause of action. When applying the
discovery rule, the courts disagree, however, as to what constitutes suffi-
cient notice. Three theories of accrual have been acknowledged. The old-
est approach, reflected in Urie, maintains that a cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff discovers the injury. This approach was first utilized in
asbestos litigation in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp..38
Borel, an asbestos insulation worker who contracted asbestosis and
mesothelioma as a result of his thirty-year exposure to asbestos, sued sev-
eral manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials in 1969.39 Borel died
before trial, and his widow was substituted as the plaintiff under the appli-
cable wrongful death statute.' Relying on Urie v. Thompson, the United
States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1980); Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809, 813
(1960).
35. 337 U.S. at 169.
36. See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
37. 337 U.S. at 170. The Court rejected the theory that each breath of silica dust was a
fresh cause of action. Justice Rutledge reasoned that application of such a rule would bar
Urie's suit if he had left employment of the railroad, or if he had been transferred to work
involving no exposure to silica dust, more than three years before discovering the disease.
The majority opinion established that Congress, in enacting FELA did not intend to attach
such consequences to "blameless ignorance." Id
38. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
39. Borel named as defendants eleven manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials
used by him during his working career. Four manufacturers settled the case with Borel
before trial and the trial court instructed a verdict as to the fifth manufacturer. The remain-
ing defendants were Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, Johns-Manville Products Cor-
poration, Pittsburg Coming Corporation, Philip Carey Corporation, Armstrong Cork
Corporation, and Ruberoid Corporation, a Division of GAF Corporation. Id at 1086.
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671, 5525 (Vernon 1959).
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that Borel's action was
not time-barred because his claim did not arise until Borel discovered the
injuries in 1969.41 In reaching its conclusion, the court followed the rule
previously utilized in cases involving injuries from exposure to other
harmful substances 42 and applied it to a case involving an asbestos
victim.
43
The discovery rule was not only broadly applied, but also liberally inter-
preted. In Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 4 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit extended the time limits of the
discovery rule by holding that the limitations period does not commence
until the plaintiff discovers the injury and its cause.41 Grigsby, a physi-
cian, suffered a substantial hearing loss in 1968 after her prolonged use of
a pharmaceutical product manufactured by the Sterling Drug Company.4
6
She did not file suit, however, until 1974.47 The court concluded that a
statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff learns or, in the exer-
cise of due dilegence, could have learned, that the injuries were caused by
an undisclosed defect in the defendant's product.4 ' Although the full ex-
tent of Grigsby's injuries had not yet become known, the court held that
she had sufficient notice of the injury and its cause in 1968.4 9 Therefore,
the court dismissed her case because she filed suit two years after the stat-
ute of limitations had expired."0
In Karala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. ,s1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expanded the discovery rule to com-
41. The court traced the recognition of asbestosis as a disease from the 1930's through
to the medical studies on asbestos insulation workers reported in the 1950's. 493 F.2d at
1088-89. See, e.g., Cooke, Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, 2
BRIT. MED. J. 147 (1924); Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of
Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965).
42. 493 F.2d at 1101.
43. Id at 1102. The court noted that asbestos is a harmful product, and provided a
detailed review of its effects. The court concluded that the manufacturer had a duty to warn
of the dangers associated with asbestos exposure. Id at 1103.
44. 428 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1975), afl'dment, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
45. See also Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesium Materials Co., 85 In. 2d
161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977).
46. Grigsby took 500 milligrams per week of Aralen, an anti-malarial drug, between
September 1966 and October 1968. In October 1968, a specialist examined her and con-
cluded that the "most likely cause" of her hearing loss was the toxicity of the Aralen. 428 F.
Supp. at 244.
47. By 1974, Grigsby's condition worsened and became an obstacle in her career. Id
48. Id at 243-44.
49. The court concluded that the statute of limitations was not precluded from running
because Grigsby's impairment did not interfere with her job. Id at 244.
50. Id at 244-45.
51. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
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mence the statute of limitations at the time the plaintiff discovered not only
the injury and its cause, but also that the injury was wrongfully inflicted by
another."2 Karjala, who worked as an asbestos insulator for eighteen
years, discovered he had asbestosis in 1966. 53 In 1971, he filed suit against
Johns-Manville Products Corporation, an asbestos manufacturer. Relying
on Borel, the court of appeals established that the asbestos manufacturer
had a duty to warn of the dangers associated with asbestos products.,4
The court stated that the six year statute of limitations" did not begin to
run until damage had resulted from the alleged breach of duty. 6 The
court acknowledged that in personal injury actions this occurs when a per-
son discovers both the injury and that the injury was caused by the defen-
dant's tortious act. Expanding upon Urie, the court held that the statute of
limitations commenced running when the injury manifested itself in a way
which supplied evidence of the causal relationship to the manufactured
product.57
In Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. 11 the Third Circuit adopted this
52. Id See also Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977); Goodman v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976); KarIjala v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975). But see Kubrick v. United
States, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). In Kubrick, the expansion of the discovery rule was rejected in a
medical malpractice context. The Court held that in medical malpractice cases filed under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), the cause of action accrues when a patient
acquires possession of the critical facts of injury and cause. 444 U.S. at 122-24. But cf.
Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980). The court in Stoleson held that, in
latent injury actions, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware of the injury, the
cause, and the possibility that one's legal rights have been invaded. The court distinguished
Kubrick on the grounds that medical science acknowledged Kubrick's treatment as inade-
quate and thus Kubrick was not blameless for his ignorance and delay in filing his claim.
629 F.2d at 1269-70. See generally Note, Stoleson t. United States.: FTCA-Expanding the
Discovery Rule in Occupational Disease Cases, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 873 (1981).
53. Between 1948 and his resignation in June, 1966, Karjala was exposed to large quan-
tities of asbestos dust. In 1959, after Karjala began to feel congestion, a shortness of breath,
loss of appetite and general weakness, he was x-rayed for tuberculosis. The x-ray showed no
evidence of tuberculosis, but revealed "possible asbestosis." In 1963, Karjala had a tumor
removed from his right lung and in 1966 another x-ray revealed asbestosis. Upon advice of
his doctor, he quit his job. 523 F.2d at 156.
54. The court stated that failure to provide such warnings renders the product unrea-
sonably dangerous and subjects the manufacturer to liability for damages under strict liabil-
ity in tort. Id at 158. See generaly RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 388, 394, 402A
(1965) (in order to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller must
put warnings on the containers).
55. The applicable Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(5) (Supp. 1975), set
six years as the period within which an action for personal injuries resulting from a defective
product must be brought.
56. 523 F.2d at 160.
57. Id at 160-61.
58. 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976).
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expansive interpretation of the discovery rule. The plaintiff in Goodman
brought a negligence and breach of warranty action against the manufac-
turer of an oral contraceptive. She claimed that she had contracted throm-
bophlebitis59 and breast cancer as a result of her use of the drug.6°
Goodman discovered that she had thrombophlebitis in 1967 and was diag-
nosed as having breast cancer in 1969. She brought suit against the manu-
facturer in 1971. While the action was pending, Goodman died and her
husband, substituted as the real party in interest, filed an amended com-
plaint which included a wrongful death claim. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's summary judg-
ment6" and held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the date
of discovery of the several claims.62
At the outset, the Goodman court established that although a plaintiff's
action for the wrongful death of a spouse is independent of the deceased's
personal injury claim, it is valid only if the personal injury claim was filed
within the limitations period.63 In order to determine whether Goodman's
action was time-barred, the court reviewed the limitations period for per-
sonal injury actions." Applying New Jersey law, the court ruled that the
statute did not begin to run until the injured party knew not only of the
existence of the injury and its cause, but also that the injury was negli-
gently caused by the defendant.65 Treating the thrombophlebitis claim
and the cancer claim as two separate actionable claims, the court acknowl-
edged that the thrombophlebitis action was time-barred by the three-year
statute of limitations, but held that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to when Mrs. Goodman might have maintained a claim for cancer.
66
Therefore, the court reversed the order granting summary judgment.
The court recognized the rule against splitting a cause of action,67 but
59. Thrombophlebitis is a condition of inflammation which affects the vein wall; it may
occur in multiple sites simultaneously or at intervals. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY, supra note 8, at 1449.
60. Mrs. Goodman used an estrogen compound, Oracon, from April 4 through June 19,
1967. 534 F.2d at 568.
61. The district court held that the various claims asserted were barred by the statute of
limitations applicable to personal injuries. 388 F. Supp. 1070, 1073-75 (D.N.J. 1974).
62. 534 F.2d at 568.
63. Id at 569-70. The applicable statutory provision is found at N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:
14-2 (West 1951).
64. 534 F.2d at 570-71.
65. Id at 570.
66. Id at 574-75.
67. The district court held that the cancer claim was barred by virtue of the discovery in
June of 1967 of the thrombophlebitis claim. The district court reasoned that if it looked to
the separate dates of discovery it would permit the splitting of a cause of action for a single
personal injury. 388 F. Supp. at 1074-75. The court of appeals reviewed the district court's
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deemed it inapplicable because the thrombophlebitis and the cancer were
the results of an exposure to two different risks, stemming from two sepa-
rate chains of causality.68 By characterizing the injuries in this manner,
the court avoided addressing the question of whether application of the
discovery rule to the cancer claim would violate the rule against splitting a
cause of action.69
In Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell,70 however, the California
Court of Appeals did address the rule against splitting a cause of action in
a latent injury context. Martinez began taking MER/29, an anticholester-
ol drug, in 1960. Six months later, he developed macula edema, a retinal
swelling, and severe dermatitis.?' After determining that MER/29 caused
the illness, Martinez discontinued the drug, and five months later, both
illnesses improved.72 Between 1961 and 1975 Martinez experienced no
complications. In 1976, however, he developed cataracts, and filed a prod-
ucts liability action against Richardson-Merrell, the manufacturer of
MER/29. The trial court granted the company's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the action was time-barred because the one-
year statute of limitations commenced when Martinez discovered the ill-
nesses in 196 1.7  The California Court of Appeals reversed the summary
judgment, and held that Martinez was not time-barred as a matter of law
from bringing suit for the injury he discovered in 1976.74
Focusing on the rule against splitting a cause of action,75 the court em-
holding and acknowledged that "Ithe rule against splitting a cause of action in New Jersey
is well settled." 534 F.2d at 574. See, e.g., Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super. 393, 291
A.2d 849 (App. Div. 1972); Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. Eq. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
68. Goodman, 534 F.2d 574.
69. It is possible to infer from the court's holding that if it determined that the cancer
claim was filed within two years after it was discovered, the court would have addressed the
cancer claim as a separate action. See Goodman, 534 F.2d at 574.
70. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980).
71. Id at 318-19, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
72. Id at 319, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
73. The trial court reasoned that the statute began to run when Martinez knew or
should have known that he had suffered an injury as the probable result of ingesting MER/
29. The trial court stated that Martinez possessed the elements of a cause of action necessary
to bring suit when he discovered the illnesses in 1961. Id at 321, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
74. The court noted that in reversing the summary judgment, it had not addressed the
statute of limitations question, the real issue on appeal. The court realized that, on remand,
the question before the trial court would be whether Martinez could proceed against the
defendants on the theory that his cataracts were caused by MER/29, even though his action
was filed years after he knew or should have known that he had suffered some injury from
that product. Id at 322, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
75. Id at 323, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595. The court acknowledged that Calvin v. Thayer,
150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1957), demonstrated the traditional concept of what
constitutes a cause of action for personal injuries. The Calvin court held that the statute of
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phasized that the definition of a cause of action for a personal injury in-
volving a direct trauma is not appropriate in cases where ingestion of a
harmful substance may result in life-threatening injuries decades later.76
The court noted various developments indicating a trend away from strict
adherence to the rule against splitting a cause of action. First, the court
referred to the statute of limitations applicable to nuisance cases, and
noted that a plaintiff may elect to treat a permanent nuisance as a tempo-
rary one and bring successive claims upon it without encountering a plea
of merger.77 The Restatement of Judgments also provides an exception to
the general rule against splitting a cause of action when an "extraordinary
reason" is present,78 or if the first judgment is not a just fulfillment of a
statutory or constitutional plan.79 Thus, the Martinez court recommended
exceptions to the rule against splitting a cause of action in an effort to
avoid a "miscarriage of justice" in latent injury actions.80
In 1981, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
also permitted a cause of action to be adjudicated upon discovery of a
second injury. In Fearson v. Johns-Man ville Sales Corp. , I an asbestos in-
sulation worker filed a claim in 1973 under a workers compensation pro-
gram after a physician informed him that he had asbestosis.8 2 Fearson
received a $50,000 settlement for his claim. Subsequently, he was diag-
nosed as having bronchogenic carcinoma, a cancer of the lung. Fearson
limitations commences to run when the "plaintiffs [acquire] knowledge of the facts constitut-
ing their cause of action." Id at 616, 310 P.2d at 62. However, the court noted that Calvin
illustrated the injustice of the general rule when applied to Martinez. Martinez would have
been forced to argue for speculative damages on the possibility of his contracting cataracts,
had he brought suit in 1962 for dermatitis and macula edema. The court admitted that
Martinez "would have been laughed out of court" had he argued for such speculative dam-
ages. Martinez, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
76. Id at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
77. Id at 326, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. The court stated the nuisance cases demon-
strated a recognition that "under certain circumstances a plaintiff need not put all of his eggs
in one basket, particularly when he does not know how many eggs" he will eventually have.
1d
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 61.2(0 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
79. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597. The Martinez court stated simply
that Martinez's case fit well within both exceptions. Id
80. The court acknowledged that these developments revealed a trend away from strict
adherence to the rules governing a cause of action and toward a set of rules which enable the
plaintiff to recover for a just claim without prejudicing the defendants or violating estab-
lished rules of law, such as the doctrine of res judicata. Id The court, however, did not
explain the method by which a court could extend relief to the plaintiff without splitting a
cause of action.
81. 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981).
82. Id at 673.
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died within three months, and his wife filed survival and wrongful death
actions in 1980 based upon her husband's death due to the cancer.
In contrast to the Martinez court, the Fearson court did not rely on carv-
ing out a new exception to the rule against splitting a cause of action. In-
stead, it expressly denied that the alleged wrongful act gave rise to only
one cause of action. It stated that Fearson's awareness of an injury in 1973
did not sufficiently notify him of the impending development of cancer
four years later. 8 Relying on Grigsby, the court applied the discovery
rule, but expanded its application and held that Fearson's wife had a sepa-
rate cause of action based upon the discovery of cancer in 1979.84 The
court reasoned that the alternative, barring a claim based on the second
injury, would force a person to seek speculative damages for all possible
future injuries upon diagnosis of any minimal problem. 5 The court, how-
ever, by electing the least restrictive alternative, eluded the question of
whether the extension of the discovery rule to a second injury violates the
rule against splitting a cause of action.
II. WILSON V JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CojRP.: DEFINING DISCOVERY
RULE APPLICATION IN MULTIPLE INJURY LITIGATION
In an effort to determine whether application of the discovery rule to a
second injury violates the rule against splitting a cause of action, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
cently provided a practical analysis of the statute of limitations in latent
83. The court denied that the cancer was simply a maturation of the harm from expo-
sure to asbestos. The court rejected the theory that Fearson had only one, indivisible cause
of action which arose from the exposure to asbestos and that the action accrued when the
asbestosis was diagnosed in 1973. Id at 673-74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
84. Fearson, 525 F. Supp. at 674. The Fearson court affirmed notice as an element
necessary to trigger the running of a statute of limitations by asserting that a new cause of
action was created at the discovery of the second injury because the decedent did not know
that he had cancer until it was diagnosed in 1979. Id The court, however, did not explain
why the extension of the discovery rule did not violate the rule against splitting a cause of
action. It simply stated that because asbestosis and bronchogenic carcinoma are indepen-
dent diseases, the fact that Fearson was diagnosed as having asbestosis in 1973 had no bear-
ing on his cause of action based upon injury and death due to the discovery of cancer in
1979. Id at 673-74.
85. The court referred to a hypothetical to illustrate its reasoning on this point:
Suppose an individual takes a drug which causes a skin rash which disappears in a
few days and no legal action is brought because of the minimal harm caused.
Years later, the individual discovers that he or she has cancer which resulted from
use of the same product. Under the defendants' theory, the failure to sue for the
skin rash would bar the suit for cancer. This exceeds the bounds of common sense
as well as sound legal reasoning.
Id at 674 n.4.
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injury cases. In Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,86 the court extended
the statute of limitations in order to provide relief to plaintiffs who, years
after discovering one illness, discover an entirely separate injury.
From 1941 until 1973, Henry J. Wilson was steadily employed as an
insulation worker at various construction sites in the metropolitan Wash-
ington, D.C. area. As an integral part of his employment, Wilson regularly
handled and was otherwise exposed to asbestos products. In 1973, after he
was x-rayed as part of his local union's routine program, Wilson was told
he had contracted asbestosis. Subsequently, Wilson's health rapidly de-
clined. After Wilson suffered two heart attacks in 1974 and a collapsed
lung in 1975, his doctor ordered him to retire. In February of 1978, Wilson
was hospitalized and diagnosed as having mesothelioma, a cancer affecting
the lining of the lung. On May 17, 1978, Wilson died from malignant
mesothelioma8 7 One year later, Wilson's widow brought a survival8 and
wrongful death 9 action against Johns-Manville Corporation in federal
court.
Upon completion of discovery, Johns-Manville moved for summary
judgment contending that Wilson was barred from action by the three-
year statute of limitations. 90 Because Wilson discovered that he had asbes-
tosis in 1973, Johns-Manville argued that his cause of action accrued at
that time and concluded that his 1979 action was time-barred. 9' The dis-
trict court granted Johns-Manville's motion, but provided no written opin-
86. 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
87. The autopsy report stated:
The immediate cause of death of this 56 year old White male, HENRY J. WIL-
SON, is bronchopneumonia .... The primary disease process suffered by this
patient was a malignant mesothelioma originating in the right pleural space ....
[I]t is my opinion that Mr. Wilson sustained heavy exposure to asbestos products
and developed pulmonary asbestosis and malignant mesotheioma as a result of
this exposure.
Id at 113 n.8.
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981).
89. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1981).
90. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981).
91. Johns-Manville also argued that Mrs. Wilson was estopped from denying that as-
bestosis was the cause of her husband's death. It stated that her admission that asbestosis
was in part a cause of Henry Wilson's death clearly established that the action accrued no
later than 1973, when the asbestosis diagnosis was made. The district court did not rule on
the estoppel issue..
The court of appeals addressed the estoppel argument and held that damages due to as-
bestosis and mesothelioma were a basis for separate and distinct claims of relief. The court
of appeals noted that on remand, a claim for relief due to the harm caused by mesothelioma
could be pursued. The court acknowledged that, in contrast, any recovery for the harm
caused by asbestosis was time-barred. Accordingly, Mrs. Wilson agreed to limit the action
to damages caused by mesotheioma. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 114 n. 14.
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ion or memorandum explanation for its judgment.92 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower
court's ruling.
Judge Ginsburg, writing for the court, acknowledged the mounting vol-
ume of litigation related to deaths and injuries caused by exposure to as-
bestos products.93 Turning to the statute of limitations, Judge Ginsburg
stated that Mrs. Wilson's survival claim94 was timely only if Henry Wilson
had a right of action which accrued within three years before the suit was
filed.95
Although the courts of the District of Columbia had previously applied
the discovery rule solely to medical malpractice claims,96 the court stated
that the district court implied the use of the rule in all cases in which an
injury was not immediately apparent.97 It noted that federal courts, apply-
ing District of Columbia law, employed the discovery rule in latent injury
actions." Finally, quoting the Supreme Court decision in Burnett v. New
92. The court of appeals admonished the district court for disposing of the case in this
manner. The court stated that without a written explanation, an appellate court has great
difficulty in discerning the reasoning and authorities relied on by the district court. The
court of appeals reviewed the transcript of oral argument on the summary judgment motion.
From the transcript of the proceedings, the court discerned that the district court believed
that Wilson's exposure to asbestos gave rise to only one cause of action which accrued when
asbestosis was diagnosed. Id at 115 n.16.
93. See supra note I and accompanying text. The court noted that members of both the
House and the Senate have introduced bills which would provide a comprehensive, nation-
wide compensation scheme covering workers who die or are disabled or injured as a result
of asbestos exposure. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 112 n.l. See S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Nonetheless, the court maintained that courts may
not rely on proposed legislative solutions to avoid their obligation to resolve the cases before
them in an equitable manner. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 112 n.l.
94. Citing Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of D.C., 575 F.2d 922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the
Wilson court noted that the Survival Act was "designed to place the deceased's estate in the
position it would have been in had the deceased's life not been cut short." Wilson, 684 F.2d
at 115 n.20. The court affirmed that a crucial determination in a survival claim is the date a
cause of action accrued. Id See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
95. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 115-17. The court, however, did recognize that some courts still
adhere to the traditional view that a cause of action accrues at the time of invasion of a
plaintiff's body. Id at 115. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008,
1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C. 1979).
97. The court stated that Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d at 615, indicated that malpractice cases
were only examples of tort claims in which the injury was not immediately visible. The
court inferred that the Burns intent was to apply the discovery rule to all personal injury
claims in which the harm was not readily apparent. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 116.
98. Id In personal injury actions, a statute of limitations inquiry is a substantive ques-
tion. Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), mandates that on nonfederal questions a
federal district court apply the law of the forum in which it sits. See Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Thus, in a personal injury context, statutes of limitations are
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York Central Railroad, the court stated that the application of the discov-
ery rule was widely supported in commentary when "the interests of jus-
tice require vindication of the plaintiffs rights."99
Having determined that the discovery rule was applicable in latent in-
jury actions, the court then addressed Johns-Manville's central contention
that Wilson had only one cause of action for all asbestos-related inju-
ries."oo Johns-Manville asserted that the cause of action accrued when
Wilson discovered that he was suffering from asbestosis in 1973, five years
before he discovered that he had cancer.' 0 ' Focusing on the alleged
wrongful conduct, the company argued that once some harm is apparent, a
claim accrues not only for that harm but also for any harm that may de-
velop in the future as a result of the wrongful exposure.' 0 2 Moreover, the
company asserted that Wilson did not have the option to waive tort recov-
ery for the asbestosis and bring suit for the mesothelioma when the condi-
tion developed in 1978.103 Johns-Manville concluded that, had Wilson
sued between 1973 and 1976, he would have been barred from action in
1978 by the well-established rule that a claim for suit may not be split.
1
0
In its discussion, the court first established that it was not concerned
with whether judgment on a claim for asbestosis pursued between 1973
and 1976 would have precluded a later claim based on mesothelioma in
1978.105 According to Judge Ginsburg, the doctrines of res judicata' °6 and
considered substantive and in a diversity case, the District of Columbia federal courts are
bound to apply the law which the courts of the District of Columbia would apply to the suit.
Wilson, 684 F.2d at 116.
99. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117 (quoting Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428
(1965)). See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. Johns-Manville argued that even if the discovery rule was applicable to the Wilson
case, the survival claim was still barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Wilson, 684
F.2d at 117.
101. Id The same argument was rejected by the district court in Fearson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671, 672-73 (D.D.C. 1981).
102. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117.
103. Johns-Manville conceded, however, that asbestosis and mesotheioma are separate
and distinct diseases, and that mesothelioma is not a complication of the asbestosis. Id at
117 n.33. See also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976). The
Goodman court stated that no evidence existed linking the thrombophiebitis and the carci-
noma as the product of the same chain of causality. Id at 574. See supra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text.
104. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
24-26 (1982). But cf. Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316,
164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980). The Martinez court recognized the exemptions to the rule against
splitting a cause of action in the tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS. Id at 326, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. For a full discussion of Martinez, see supra
notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
105. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117.
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collateral estoppel,"°7 which concern the consequences of prior adjudica-
tion, would govern such a question. The court stated that instead the issue
to be decided was whether manifestation of any asbestos-related disease
triggered the running of the statute of limitations on all separate, distinct
and later-manifested diseases resulting from the same asbestos
exposure.'0 8
Focusing on the statute of limitations, the court distinguished the poli-
cies underlying the statute from the purposes served by the law of judg-
ments."' The rules of judgments, res judicata and collateral estoppel,
prevent the cost and confusion of multiple lawsuits and simultaneously
encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions."10
Statutes of limitations, on the other hand, motivate timely adjudication of
claims by placing a time limitation on the commencement of litigation."'I
Because no prior adjudication of Wilson's claims had occurred, the court
addressed Wilson's action within the context of the statute of limita-
tions. 2* The court enunciated two considerations which underlie a statute
of limitations." 3 The first, characterized as repose, protects potential de-
fendants from stale claims by allowing them to plan future business with-
out the threat of distant liability." 4 The second, identified as evidentiary,
106. Id See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
107. The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents a party from relitigating an issue deter-
mined in a prior judgment. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
108. The court stated that by focusing on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, Johns-Manville misdirected its attention because no prior adjudication of Wilson's
claims had occurred. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 118.
109. Id at 118-19. The Martinez court also compared the law of judgments with the
principles behind a statute of limitations. Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105
Cal. App. 3d at 325-26, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
110. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). See also J. MOORE, supra note 6, at 1164-
65. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 104, at 196-249 (the
courts, through the operation of the doctrine of res judicata, provide a finality of judgments).
11. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119. For a Supreme Court statement of the policies underlying
a statute of limitations, see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Chase Securi-
ties Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Railroad Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
112. Judge Ginsburg observed that neither the summary judgment in Wilson, supra note
92, nor the memorandum opinion in Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp.
671, 674 n.4 (D.D.C. 1981), facilitated the statute of limitations inquiry. Wilson, 684 F.2d at
118 n.37.
113. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 118-19.
114. Id at 119. See Kelley, supra note 15, at 1644. Early release from liability under
short limitations periods, however, runs counter to the position advanced by some commen-
tators that in a free market, the risk of product liability is best placed on the entrepreneur.
See, e.g., Calabresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 313, 324 (1978); Comment, supra note 19, at 157. See also supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text.
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encourages prompt adjudication to ensure that loss of evidence or unavail-
ability of witnesses does not hinder litigation." 5 Judge Ginsburg recog-
nized that the value of repose would be best served by Johns-Manville's
definition of a cause of action." 16 Nonetheless, because the evidence in
latent injury litigation tends to develop over time rather than disappear as
in traditional personal injury litigation, the court maintained that the evi-
dentiary considerations outweighed the repose value." 7
Once it determined that latent injury actions involved unique eviden-
tiary considerations, the court reviewed the community interests embodied
in personal injury and wrongful death claims." i8 The court noted that pro-
viding a system of recovery which "sufficiently but not excessively" com-
pensates latent injury victims, is an interest which the community seeks to
advance.1' This interest, however, would be substantially undermined by
a rule that limited the application of the discovery rule to the manifesta-
tion of a first injury.'20 Similarly, the interest in providing a plaintiff with
relief would be seriously impaired if a plaintiff were forced, upon discov-
ery of one injury, to argue for speculative damages based on the
probability of the manifestation of another injury.' Pursuing relief
under the "reasonably certain" standard, difficult in asbestos litigation,1
22
115. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of Johns-Manville's definition of a cause of action, see supra notes
100-04.
117. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119. Although the traditional rule of accrual provides repose
for potential defendants by protecting them from stale claims, there is little risk in latent
injury actions that a defendant will be unfairly surprised. A manufacturer whose employees
are exposed to toxic substances may expect that his employees will develop future injuries.
In addition, the evidence regarding those injuries is more apparent over time as the disease
manifests itself. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 173, 371 A.2d 170, 176 (1977).
See Note, Statutes of Limitations and Pollutant Inuries. The Needfor a Contemporary Legal
Response to Contemporary Technological Failure, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1525, 1558 (1981).
Also, defendants to latent injury actions need time to discover a probable causal connection
between the injuries a plaintiff suffers, and the harmful substance the defendant manufac-
tured. See Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decirion, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 1375, 1381 (1975).
118. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119. The court identified the interests involved as a plaintiff's
interest in obtaining "at least adequate compensation" and a defendant's interest "in paying
no more than that." Id
119. Id See generally Comment, supra note 19.
120. A plaintiff would be barred from action upon discovery of a second injury. Wilson,
684 F.2d at 119. If a manufacturer is liable for the delayed manifestation of the effects of his
product, it is unjust to absolve him of that liability simply because the plaintiff suffered other
different and independent effects for which he did not bring suit. Martinez-Ferrer v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1980).
121. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119. For a discussion of the "reasonably certain" rule, see supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
122. The court notes that approximately 15% of asbestosis sufferers later contract pleural
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would severely limit a plaintiff's chances for recovery. 123 Thus, the court
concluded that a potential defendant's interest in repose was outweighed
by the community interest in providing fair recovery in latent disease
cases.
Finally, Judge Ginsburg acknowledged that a concern for judicial econ-
omy influenced the court's decision.I24 The court noted that under its ap-
plication of the discovery rule, an injured party would not be forced to
litigate upon diagnosis of an initial injury. Other sources of relief, such as
workers compensation or private insurance, may provide adequate recom-
pense for the initial illness. 125 If no further disease developed, an individ-
ual would have no reason to file a claim. According to Johns-Manville,
however, if a person was told that another more serious disease could man-
ifest itself at a later date, but that a judicial remedy would be barred unless
a current action was filed, the individual would almost certainly seek judi-
cial relief.' 26 Therefore, the resultant incentive to litigate would aggravate
the already overburdened judicial system. 127 Because the court concluded
evidentiary considerations, judicial economy, and the interests of plaintiff
relief outweighed the defendant's interest in repose, it commenced the lim-
itations period at the time Wilson discovered that he had cancer and thus
held the survival action was timely.
28
mesothelioma and 12% contract peritoneal mesothelioma. See Selikoff, Churg & Ham-
mond, Relation Between Exposure to Asbestos and Mesothelioma, 272 NEw ENG. J. MED.
560, 562 (1965). If a plaintiff did argue for damages for possible mesothelioma, the court
predicted that Johns-Manville would argue that the probability of mesothelioma is far less
than 50%, and is therefore too speculative to support a damage award. Wilson, 684 F.2d at
120. In addition, the court indicated the inequity of the "reasonably certain" rule among
individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who sustain the future harm are undercompensated and
those who elude it receive a windfall. Id at 120 n.45.
123. The court suggested that recently some courts have revised the "reasonably certain"
standard. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119-20 n.44. The traditional standard has been replaced by a
"simple probability" or "pro-rata" approach. Such an approach allows a plaintiff recovery
equal to his chance of incurring the future harm. See, e.g., Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618,
640-41 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely, J., concurring); J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 106
(1972); King, supra note 25, at 1381-87. The pro-rata approach is followed in England. See
Cooper, Assessing Possibilities in Damage Award&-The Loss of a Chance or the Chance of a
Loss, 37 SASK. L. REv. 193, 196-97 (1971). The court maintained that the pro-rata approach
did not eliminate the inequity to plaintiffs. Those who suffer future harm are undercompen-
sated, and those who escape it are overcompensated. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119-20 n.44.
124. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120.
125. In Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981), the
plaintiff filed for damages due to asbestosis under the Workers Compensation Program and
received a $50,000 settlement. Id at 672. For a detailed discussion of Fearson, see supra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
126. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120.
127. Id
128. Id The court also held that the wrongful death action was timely because it was
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III. WILSON AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE EXPOSURE VICTIMS AND THE
MANUFACTURERS OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES
The Wilson court, in an unprecedented circuit court holding, offered
toxic-exposure victims judicial relief. The court's procedure of affording
relief began with a fundamental application of the discovery rule. 29 After
accomplishing this task with the assistance of District of Columbia prece-
dent, the court ventured to apply the discovery rule to a second, although
entirely separate injury. The court, in defining the application of the dis-
covery rule, limited its holding to only those cases where no adjudication
of the first injury has occurred. By restricting its holding to only those
cases where there has been no former adjudication, 3 ' the court created the
opportunity to begin the limitations period upon discovery of a second
injury.
In Urie, the Supreme Court fulfilled Congress's intent in enacting the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to furnish injured employees with an av-
enue of relief. The Court tolled the limitations period until the accumu-
lated effects of the harmful substance manifested themselves.' 3 ' The
foundation for the Urie interpretation of the statute of limitations was the
Court's assumption that the element of notice is essential to the accrual of
a cause of action. The Wilson court transcended the Urie statute of limita-
tions interpretation in order to recompense the new lot of latent injury
litigants, who years after discovering one illness, discover another entirely
separate injury.
3 2
Wilson like Martinez, provides relief by permitting a cause of action to
be adjudicated upon discovery of a second injury. In contrast with Marti-
nez, however, Wilson did not recommend a new exception to the rule
against splitting a cause of action. Rather, the court focused on the doc-
trine of res judicata and emphasized that no prior adjudication of Wilson's
first injury claim had occurred.' 33 Consequently, the Wilson court was
free to address Wilson's second injury claim strictly within the statute of
limitations context. Therefore, the court artfully allowed recovery for mul-
brought within one year after Henry Wilson's death. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2702 (1981)
(wrongful death actions "shall be brought ... within one year after the death of the person
injured").
129. For a discussion of the policies underlying a statute of limitations, see supra notes
17-19 and accompanying text.
130. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117.
131. For a discussion of Urie, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
132. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 115-20.
133. Id at 118.
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tiple latent injury victims without creating ambiguous exceptions to the
rule against splitting a cause of action.
The Wilson court's expansive application of the discovery rule will result
in several immediate and long-range effects. The liberal interpretation of
the limitations requirement will increase the probability of plaintiff recov-
ery. The likelihood of recovery will in turn increase the amount of latent
injury litigation.1 31 Unless the limitations period has expired on both inju-
ries, a court following Wilson will be obligated to hold lengthy hearings on
the merits of each case. Thus, the expansive application of the statute of
limitations may exacerbate an already overburdened judicial system-the
very result the Wilson court wished to avoid.
135
A further consequence of the Wilson court's expansive interpretation of
the statute of limitations is that manufacturers of toxic substances may in-
cur severe litigation expenses. Traditionally, product liability defendants
have used summary judgment as an effective method to avoid the burden
and expense of full litigation. 136 Because Wilson allows a plaintiff to file
suit within a reasonable time after discovery of the second injury, fewer
defendants will succeed in establishing that a plaintiff is time-barred from
pursuing a cause of action. This result will force defendants to actually
litigate the statute of limitations issue, often a long and expensive process.
The possibility of the associated costs may severely affect the manufactur-
ers of toxic substances.
For instance, product manufacturers may face an increasing threat of
financial insolvency.' 37 The striking escalation of latent injury litigation
has already caused the manufacturers, insurers, and attorneys involved
134. Because plaintiffs who failed to file for a first injury can now proceed with an action
based on the second injury in spite of the rule against splitting a cause of action, Wilson 684
F.2d at 120, the likelihood of plaintiff recovery is increased.
135. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120.
136. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment shall be
granted for the moving party if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. Cv. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of prov-
ing that there exists no genuine issue of any material fact. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727, at 524-25 (1973). However, the adverse party
may not rely merely upon general allegations to show the existence of a genuine issue for
trial. He must set forth specific facts that establish the existence of such an issue. FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(e). See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1963) (per curiam);
Smith v. Pittsburg Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1972).
137. In an environmental and occupational health survey, Epidemiology Resources, Inc.,
a consulting firm, estimated that 52,000 asbestos suits will be filed in the future against
Johns-Manville alone. Rotbart, Manville Filing Expected to Have a Wide Effect, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
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great alarm.'38 With the addition of an entirely new group of claimants,
who discover a second illness after failing to litigate a first injury, asbestos
manufacturers could be held liable for billions of dollars in damage
suits.' 39  Although most manufacturing companies are insured,"s ex-
panded liability may exhaust their insurance. This will force a manufac-
turer to pay the liability and court expenses on all future litigation.
Because most product manufacturers are unprepared to pay expanded
liabilty and litigation expenses, they face financial instability and the
threat of bankruptcy. In fact, only one day before Wilson was decided, an
asbestos manufacturer, UNR Industries, confronted with 17,000 pending
asbestos damage claims, filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act. 4 ' The threat of insolvency of other major manufactur-
ing companies has prompted Congress to consider federal legislation to aid
exposure victims.
142
In contrast to the adverse effects upon the manufacturers of toxic sub-
stances, the Wilson decision has offset the harm suffered by latent injury
victims. Plaintiffs who were previously time-barred from filing suit upon
the discovery of a second injury may now obtain compensation under the
Wilson theory that "damages occasioned by two distinct illnesses provide
the foundation for separate and distinct claims of relief."'
143
Although Wilson provided plaintiff relief where it was inherently justifi-
138. See Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139 (1981).
139. It was estimated that the future 52,000 asbestos suits would cost Johns-Manville
approximately two billion dollars. Rotbart, supra note 137, at 3, col. 1.
140. Most asbestos manufacturers that have changed insurance companies are battling
their prior insurers in the courts to determine which insurer is responsible for reimbursing
the asbestos manufacturers for the expenses of the asbestos litigation. At issue is whether
liability attaches when the worker first manifests symptoms of a disease or when he is first
exposed to the products causing the injury. See Granelli, supra note 1, at 24. In 1981, the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that insurance coverage was triggered both at the time of
exposure and manifestation and was also triggered while the asbestos fibers are "in resi-
dence." See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1044 n.20
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
141. In re UNR Indust. Inc., Nos. 82-B9841, 82-B9851 (Bankr. N.D. II. July 29, 1982).
On August 26, 1982, Manville Corp., the parent company of Johns-Manville, filed for
reorganization under chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101-110 (1978).
In re Manville Corp., No. 82B (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1982). Manville Corp. cited
16,000 pending asbestos lawsuits and the 52,000 potential lawsuits estimated by Epidemiol-
ogy Resources, Inc., as reason for its Bankruptcy filing. See Barnaby Feder, Manville Seeks
Protection Under Chapter 11, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6, for a discussion of the
Bankruptcy filing of the Manville Corporation.
142. See note 93 for a discussion of Congress' proposed legislation. See Dole Says
Manvile Filing to Affect Review of U.S. Bankruptcy Code by Senate Panel, Wall St. J., Aug.
30, 1982, at 3, col. 2-3.
143. Wilson 684 F.2d at 114 n.14.
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able, the court's holding is sufficiently vague to question whether a plaintiff
is able to sue for asbestos and mesothelioma in two separate suits, at differ-
ent times, and recover damages for each action. Specifically stating that it
did not intend to decide such an issue,' the Wilson court nevertheless
suggested that res judicata or collateral estoppel would apply to a case in
which former litigation had occurred. 45 The court stated, however, that
"asbestosis and mesothelioma provide the basis for separate and distinct
claims of relief."' 46 This statement implies that a separate cause of action
may be pursued for each distinct injury resulting from the same toxic ex-
posure and, therefore, suggests that res judicata and collateral estoppel
may not apply in latent injury litigation. Although Wilson left this issue
for another court to decide, Judge Ginsburg, by expanding the application
of the discovery rule, provides an equitable system of recovery for latent
injury victims who, years after discovering one illness, discover another
more damaging injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. defined discovery rule application in the multi-
ple injury context by commencing the limitations period upon discovery of
a second injury. The interpretation of the discovery rule in Wilson will
have diverse effects. The expansive application will provide relief to many
toxic exposure victims who after waiving tort recovery for one injury, dis-
cover another illness resulting from the same harmful substance. On the
other hand, this liberal interpretation will aggravate the already striking
escalation of latent injury actions, thus increasing the likelihood of a prod-
uct manufacturer's financial insolvency. The impetus behind these effects
is the desire to secure fair compensation for an individual who suffers seri-
ous harm. Such expansive application, however, may effectively abandon
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in latent injury litiga-
tion. Nonetheless, Wilson properly mandates that an individual exposed
to toxic substances and subject to latent harm, will have an effective route
to pursue in order to obtain just compensation.
Kim Marie Covello
144. Id at 117.
145. Id at 117-18.
146. id at 114 n.14.
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